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ABSTRACT
Security experts often question why some users take actions that
could expose them to security and privacy risks. Using unsecured
Wi-Fi networks is one common example. Even though mobile data
is now a more secure means to connect to the Internet, and is be-
coming faster and more affordable, many users continue to use
unsecured Wi-Fi. To identify risk mitigating strategies, the research
community first needs to understand the underlying factors driving
users’ decisions. Previous studies examined stated preferences —
what people said they have done or think they would do — but that
may not truly reflect real-life behavior. This study is the first to
examine revealed preferences — what people actually do in nat-
uralistic settings. Specifically, we investigated how users’ desire
to save mobile data and battery power influenced their decisions
at the time when they connected to open unsecured Wi-Fi in the
wild. We also examined whether the decision to use unsecured
Wi-Fi networks could be driven by demographic factors and the
user’s perception of the risk associated with using these networks.
We recruited 71 participants in the UK to install My Wi-Fi Choices,
our own Android app, on their mobile device, and run it for three
months in the background. The app captured details of mobile data
allowance and battery power on participants’ devices whenever
they used open unsecured Wi-Fi networks. We found that depleting
mobile data significantly drove participants to use these networks,
especially when their remaining allowance reached approximately
30%. Battery level, however, did not play a significant role. The per-
ceived risks of unsecured Wi-Fi did not affect the decision-making
either. Age, education, and income level were also correlated with
increased use of unsecured Wi-Fi.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Public Wi-Fi provides easy access to the Internet for many users
when needed. In the UK, there are nearly 500,000 commercial Wi-Fi
hotspots in 2018, a rapid growth of almost 200% from 2013 [16]. But
these networks are often unsecured [5], especially those that do not
use encryption, exposing users to security and privacy risks that
may arise from websites and applications transmitting sensitive
user information in clear text.
Despite growing evidence of these risks — from literature [3, 7,
17, 18, 34–36, 41] and media reports (e.g., [2, 22, 24, 25, 33, 38]) —
many people still use potentially unsecured publicWi-Fi [20, 30, 40],
even now that mobile data access is becoming faster and cheaper
[1, 28]. Understanding why people make such decisions is key to
helping us identify appropriate risk mitigating strategies.
Previous studies have investigated various factors, with mixed
results. A 2008 study found that users lacked awareness of the
risks from using unsecured public Wi-Fi [18]. However, subsequent
studies showed that users were aware of the risks [20, 31] but
showed optimism bias — that is, they did not believe they would
fall victim [39, 40]. More recent studies found that the perceived
risks did not affect decision-making but rather it was the users’
desire to conserve mobile data that drove them to use unsecured
Wi-Fi [35, 36] — an important finding given many people now
regularly use mobile data. Demographic factors such as age [20, 28],
gender [28, 35, 36], and education level [35] have also been shown
to play a role, but this influence was not consistent.
These findings shared one common limitation; they relied on
a survey or an interview of stated preferences — what users said
they have done or what they think they would do — which may not
truly reflect real-life behavior. Our study is the first to elicit users’
revealed preferences — what users actually do in natural settings —
by examining driving factors at the point when users connected to
unsecured Wi-Fi networks in the wild.
Specifically, we first examined whether users could be influenced
by the constraint of two resources: mobile data and battery power.
The study on how the desire to conserve limited resources — here-
after called resource preservation heuristic — affects decision-making
is relatively new and not very well-understood, especially in the
context of unsecured Wi-Fi usage; hence, we explored it further.
We designed an Android app, My Wi-Fi Choices, and recruited 71
participants in the UK to install it on their mobile device with the
app running in the background for three months. Whenever partic-
ipants connected to open unsecured Wi-Fi, the app captured the
remaining mobile data allowance and battery level on their devices,
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allowing us to observe how resource preservation heuristic influ-
enced decision-making. We also examined whether the perceived
risks of using these networks and demographic factors played a
role in participant’s choices.
Our findings gave new insights. Participants did not value all
resources equally. Depleting mobile data — especially when levels
reached 30% — had a significant effect in driving participants to
use unsecured Wi-Fi, but depleting battery level did not have a
similar impact. We also obtained evidence that perceived risks
of unsecured Wi-Fi did not affect participants’ decision-making.
Some demographic factors played a role but these effects were
inconsistent.
Knowledge gained from our study can help to design workable
risk mitigating strategies. Particularly, it suggests that risk miti-
gating strategies that do not rely on the users alone are needed.
Limited mobile data allowances will continue to drive users to use
unsecured Wi-Fi networks. Encouraging application developers
and public Wi-Fi providers to encrypt transmitted data is a more
promising approach.
Contributions. Overall, we make the following contributions in
this study:
• We designed and implementedMyWi-Fi Choices, an Android
app that allowed us to collect and analyze user resources at
the point when they connected to unsecured Wi-Fi rather
than relying on a survey or an interview.
• We showed that mobile data preservation heuristic played a
significant role in driving users to use unsecured Wi-Fi.
• We showed that user’s perception of risks relating to unse-
cured Wi-Fi did not affect their decision-making, and demo-
graphic factors played less of a role.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines
related work. Section 3 introduces our data collection technique
and the statistical analysis we performed. We present the results in
Section 4 and discuss the implication of our findings, the limitations
of our work, and possible future work in Section 5 before concluding
in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this Section, we reviewed prior work that examined the security
and privacy risks of unsecured Wi-Fi networks, usage of these
networks, and the factors influencing users’ decisions to use them.
2.1 Security and privacy risks of unsecured
Wi-Fi networks
Data transmitted via unsecured Wi-Fi networks are exposed to
many security and privacy risks — from eavesdropping [17, 18] to
man-in-the-middle attack [3, 7, 34]. Numerous media have reported
on the risks these networks expose users to (e.g., [2, 22, 24, 25, 33,
38]).
Previous studies have also provided supporting evidence. In 2012,
Cheng et al. [8] showed that private information of two third of
travellers were leaked when they used public Wi-Fi at 15 airports in
4 countries — worrying, given that many travellers rely on public
Wi-Fi, especially when travelling overseas. F-Secure [12], a security
company, setup a free open unsecured Wi-Fi network in London
in 2014 and captured one login credential transmitted in clear text.
Sombatruang et al. [36] performed a similar experiment in 2016,
also in London, and found private information such as date of
birth and sexual orientation being transmitted from a dating app
without any encryption. Their subsequent study in 2017 in Japan
showed more alarming evidence; sensitive information such as
private emails, login credentials, and business transactions were
transmitted in clear text [35]. While users may be aware of the
risks of entering private information on unencrypted webpages
(i.e., those served over HTTP) on a browser and may abstain from
doing so, the same cue is not visible to the users on non-browser-
based applications (apps), and their use of these apps may expose
them to more risks they may not be aware of. Prior work has shown
that some non-browser apps transmit sensitive user information in
clear text [13, 29]. Hence, this information can be easily retrieved
by an eavesdropper listening on the unsecured Wi-Fi users connect
to.
2.2 Usages of unsecured Wi-Fi networks
Empirical evidence of unsecured Wi-Fi risks is worrying — not only
because many applications do not encrypt transmitted data but also
because people continue to use the networks. This phenomenon
may seem surprising, given that mobile data, an alternative option
to connect to the Internet, is becoming cheaper and faster. However,
Action Fraud [1], the UK national fraud and cyber-crime reporting
center, reported that 76% of people in the UK with a mobile data
subscription in 2016 still use public Wi-Fi. Ofcom [28] reported a
smaller percentage, 67%, in 2017 — still considerably high given
two in three people could have had their data compromised when
using these networks.
Avast [30], a security company, setup a fake open unsecured
public Wi-Fi at a political convention in the US in 2016 and found
1,200 users connected to it — of which 44.5% used the networks
for emails and instant messaging. McShane et al. [20] also found
that 58% of public Wi-Fi users in Australia admitted to have used
free open unsecured networks in the past three months prior to the
survey — worrying, given that more than half of the participants
could have had their data exposed. The recent 2017 Norton Global
Wi-Fi Risks Report highlighted that more than half of their 15,532
survey participants from 15 countries were unable to resist using
free public Wi-Fi and 80% admitted using these networks to make
sensitive information such as email and online banking [40].
2.3 Factors affecting users’ decision to use
unsecured Wi-Fi
Previous studies have examined both proximal and distal factors
influencing decision-makings. Proximal factors affects decision-
making in immediate situations while distal factors play a role from
a greater distance.
2.3.1 Proximal factors. Several proximal factors contribute to why
users continue to use unsecured Wi-Fi. Klasnja et al. [18] inter-
viewed 11 participants and found that they did not understand the
risks of using public Wi-Fi . However, the study was conducted in
2008 when the risks of unsecured Wi-Fi networks were less publi-
cized. More recent studies have showed that users are becoming
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more knowledgeable. McShane et al. [20] found that about two-third
of their participants viewed public Wi-Fi networks as unsecured.
Seigneur et al. [31] also found that only 10% of their 1,743 survey
participants did not know about the risks and the existence of fake
public Wi-Fi. These findings all point in the same direction; most
users are aware of the risks. But why they still use the networks is
puzzling.
Optimism bias — often known as a false sense of security — may
help to explain why users continually use unsecured Wi-Fi even
when they are aware of the risks. Swanson et al. [39] found that
users of public Wi-Fi did not believe the risks would be realized.
Symantec [40] resonated the message — reporting that 60% of sur-
vey participants felt that their personal data were safe when using
public Wi-Fi, of which 15% said they felt very safe. Klasnja et al. [18]
also found that participants relied on the security of their devices
to mitigate the risks when using public Wi-Fi.
Another factor that plays a significant role, but had been under
examined until recently, is the constraint of mobile data allowance.
McShane et al. [20] found that only one in ten of their survey partic-
ipants preferred using mobile data over public Wi-Fi; however their
study did not explore how the users’ preferences changed as mo-
bile data allowance depleted. Sombatruang et al. [35, 36] addressed
this gap. Using a series of hypothetical scenarios, they found that
participants displayed a resource preservation heuristic tendency —
saying they were willing to use public Wi-Fi to save mobile data,
especially when the data allowance reached 25%, the lowest end in
the scenarios. However, their findings were based on a survey of
participants’ stated preference. We addressed this gap and exam-
ined user-generated data in naturalistic settings. We also examined
whether remaining battery power of users’ device affected their
decisions to use unsecured Wi-Fi as Wi-Fi generally consumes less
energy than does mobile data [15, 44]. Vaniea and Rashidi [42]
showed that some users were reluctant to update software because
they believe it would drain the battery — even though the update
could mitigate security risks. We put this hypothesis to the test in
the context of using unsecured Wi-Fi networks.
The effects of resource preservation on decision-making has
its root in psychology and economic literature. Previous studies
showed that the constraints of resource — be it financial related or
time — taxed cognitive bandwidth needed to think clearly and make
optimal decisions [19, 23, 32, 37, 43]. Shah et al. [32] showed how
the lack of money influenced poor participants1 to make riskier
suboptimal financial decisions; it introduced cognitive load and
interfered with participants’ ability to judge a situation effectively.
Findings from Mani et al. [19]’s lab and fieldwork experiment
echoed the findings from Shah et al. [32]. In the lab experiment,
they observed poor cognitive performance among the poor but not
the rich participants2 after asking them to think about financial
difficulties situations. Their experiment in India also supported
the theory, showing that the cognitive performance of the same
sugarcane farmers before the harvest season — when most farmers
experienced financial difficulties — was worse than their perfor-
mance after the harvest season — when farmers started earning.
They concluded that, before the harvest, the farmers’ attention
1Randomly assigned as poor or rich as part of the experiment.
2Poor participants classified as having real-life earnings in the lower quartile of the
U.S. income distribution.
was diverted toward concern about financial difficulties. Similar
behaviour was observed in another study which found that partici-
pants assigned to choose 1-2 household items for free prior to the
cognitive tests did worse than participants assigned to choose more
free items [37]. Having a small budget appeared to tax cognitive
bandwidth and impede cognitive performance.
These evidence clearly shows that resource constraints triggered
intrusive thoughts and tax cognitive bandwidth, leading to impeded
cognitive performance and sub-optimal decision-making [23, 43].
This theory may help to explain the findings in the study of Som-
batruang et al. [35, 36] which found users having limited mobile
data allowance displayed a risk-taking attitude and said they would
use unsecured Wi-Fi when mobile data allowance was running low;
an intrusive thought about running out of data taxed their mind
and blinded them from potential ramifications.
2.3.2 Distal factors. Previous studies also found some demographic
factors affected the use of unsecured Wi-Fi networks. But the find-
ings were mixed. Ofcom [28] reported more males than females
in the UK used public Wi-Fi networks. However, Sombatruang et
al. [35, 36] found the opposite. Age has also been reported to play a
role. Young people (18-24 years old) in the UK and in Australia used
more public Wi-Fi than other age groups [20, 28], which is unsur-
prising given the influence of social media nowadays. Sombatruang
et al. [35] also found that education level affected decision-making
among the Japanese; people holding a bachelor or post-graduate
degree were less likely to use public Wi-Fi.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we introduce the data collection technique, statistical
analysis, and the ethical considerations of our study.
3.1 Data collection
3.1.1 My Wi-Fi Choices app. To examine the influence of mobile
data and battery power on the use of open unsecured public Wi-Fi
networks, we developed an Android app, My Wi-Fi Choices, which
collected the actual battery level and the estimated remaining mo-
bile data allowance on a participant’s mobile device whenever they
connected to open unsecured public Wi-Fi networks. For this study,
we defined such networks as those requiring no key exchange ses-
sion when a device connects to it; hence, providing no encryption
or authentication. From the user interface perspective, they are
Figure 1: An overview work flow ofMyWi-Fi Choices.
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networks without a security padlock icon next to the Wi-Fi bar on
the screen showing a list of available Wi-Fi networks.
My Wi-Fi Choices operates in two modes: foreground (i.e., the
activities of the app are visible to the user) and background (i.e.,
the app runs as a service and is not visible to the user). We show in
Figure 1, its overview work flow and describe the details of each
mode and the data collection techniques following.
Foreground Mode. My Wi-Fi Choices runs in the foreground in
all its operation where user input is required. When participants
installed and ran the app for the first time, they were asked to agree
to the terms and conditions of our app. Once they agree, they are
asked to complete a survey (see Appendix A) where they have to
supply their mobile data plan (e.g., 1 GB per month) and the renewal
date. These initial values were used to calculate an estimated re-
maining data allowance. The app also asked participants to supply
demographic info such as gender, age group, and education level
and their perceived risks of data breach when using public Wi-Fi
and mobile data (on a scale of 0% to 100%, 0% being not very likely
and 100% being very likely). These data allow us to evaluate our
hypothesis on the factors that affect participants’ use of unsecured
Wi-Fi networks.
Background Mode.When My Wi-Fi Choices runs in background
mode, it runs services, while also listening for selected broadcasts.
In particular, after a successful completion of the survey questions,
it starts four services. The first service which is a Firebase-
InstanceIdService is used to generate tokens that we use to
uniquely identify each participant, while the second service is a
messaging service that handles notifications sent from our server to
the app. The third service registers a CONNECTIVITY_ACTION
BroadcastReceiver that is used to monitor changes in Internet
connectivity. Starting a service to register a broadcast is neces-
sary because "apps targeting Android 7.0 (API level 24) and higher
do not receive the CONNECTIVITY_ACTION broadcasts if they
declare the broadcast receiver in their manifest"3. Hence, we use
this method as a workaround to monitor when a device connects to
a network. Finally, the fourth service is responsible for collecting
the data we use in our experiment.
Similarly, in this mode, the app registers three BroadcastRece-
ivers that respectively listens for changes in Internet connectivity
(this is registered by a service as stated earlier), device boot com-
pletion, and low battery level. We listen for changes in Internet
connectivity so as to track when a user connects to unsecuredWi-Fi.
Whereas we track device boot completion and low battery level, so
as to respectively, restart the services and collect data when the
battery is low if the device is running Android versions lower than
6.0 (we explain why the app acts differently by Android version).
Data Collection Technique. To evaluate how much of a user’s
data is remaining from their data plan when they connect to unse-
cured Wi-Fi, we subtract the amount of data they have used from
the data they subscribed to. To deduce how much data a user has
used, we do so following two approaches depending on the Android
version on the device. When a device is running Android version
6.0 or higher, we read the mobile data already exhausted using
3https://developer.android.com/training/monitoring-device-state/
connectivity-monitoring.html
the NetworkStatsManager class4. The class provides access to net-
work usage history and statistics which can be used to get network
usage history for a given bucket i.e., time window e.g., one month
for monthly data plan cycle. Usage of this class requires API level
23 or higher (i.e., Android version 6 or higher) and a system-level
permission; thus, if a user refuses to grant our app the required
permission, we use the second approach to get the amount of data
already exhausted.
When a device runs an Android version lower than 6.0, we get
the data already exhausted using the TrafficStats class5. The
network traffic statistics (stats) provided by this class is reset after
every reboot by the OS, hence, its historical statistics is not as
robust as that provided by NetworkStatsManager. Therefore, to
get network stats that is almost accurate, we start a service that
reads and saves the network stats every hour as a user may turn
their device off at any time. We also register a BroadcastReceiver
that listens for low battery level and reads and saves the network
stats when the battery is low. In the same vein, if a device is not
rebooted during the period of our experiment, we reset the saved
network stats to zero at the end of a user’s data plan cycle (e.g.,
monthly).
To read the battery level of a device, we use the BatteryManager
class6. Note that we only collect data when a user connects to
unsecuredWi-Fi and to distinguish between secured and unsecured
Wi-Fi, we examine the capabilities of the access point a user is
connected to. We consider a Wi-Fi to be unsecured if it is not
encrypted e.g., using WPA or WEP. Finally, we send the data to
our server (an Amazon EC2 Ubuntu machine) via HTTPS only and
we also employ certificate pinning7 to prevent man-in-the-middle
attacks.
The data collection took place for 3-months, starting from the
date when the participant installed the app. It commenced in July
2017 and ended in December 2017.
3.1.2 Recruitment and participants. We advertised our study using
both offline and online media to promote the diversity of partici-
pants. For the former, we put the flyers on 24 notice boards around
the city. These locations included university campuses, coffee shops,
business offices, grocery stores, charity shops, local public libraries,
and construction sites. For the online channel, we advertised the
study via the university-wide and the department’s student mail-
ing lists, university web site, Twitter accounts from two of the
university’s departments, and Callforparticipants.com.
Interested participants were asked to fill out an online pre-
screening test. Eligible participants were restricted to only individu-
als living in the UK who are 18 years old or above, all of whom have
an Android device (minimum OS version 5.0) with mobile data plan,
and had used public Wi-Fi networks from time to time, according
to their responses to the self-assessed pre-screening questions.
We sent the eligible participants a link to the Google Play Store
to download My Wi-Fi Choices. Participants were allowed to install
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so before the end of September 2017 when we removed the app
from the store. Each participant received up to £20 reward for their
participation (£10 after two months and another £10 at the end of
the third month after installing the app). A total of 71 participants
were recruited. Participants encompassed a diverse demography
such as age, gender, and education level (see Appendix B).
3.2 Statistical analysis
To allow us to make an inference about general population from
the samples in our study, we applied six statistical analyses: polyno-
mial regressions, Cochran’s Q Test, Student’s T-Test, Levene’s Test,
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, and binary logistics regression.
Polynomial regressions allowed us to build a model of how par-
ticipants connected to unsecured Wi-Fi at different point in their
mobile data allowance and battery power. We used Cochran’s Q
Test, an appropriate test for our data type, to examine whether the
changes observed among data points in the polynomial regression
models were statistically significant. We used T-Test to determine
whether the perceived likelihood that unsecured Wi-Fi could be
compromised between participants connecting to and not connect-
ing to the networks were statistically different. Levene’s Test was
for testing the homogeneity of variances needed in Student T-Test.
PearsonâĂŹs correlation analyzed whether the frequency of using
unsecured Wi-Fi could be influenced by the perceived risks of us-
ing the networks. Finally, binary logistics regression predicted the
probability of participants using — or not using — unsecured Wi-Fi
networks based on their demographic factors. More details of each
test are in Section 4. We used SPSS to run all analysis.
3.3 Ethics approval
We submitted the study design to the Ethics Chair Actions (part
of the IRBs of the institution in the UK) prior to commencing the
fieldwork. We were granted permission for the study provided: 1)
we collected data anonymously and explained the study to the par-
ticipants and received consent from them; 2) we complied with data
protection law. Our app did not collect any personally identifiable
information. We informed participants about the study during the
recruitment and included an information sheet in the app that par-
ticipants could refer to at any time. Participants were also presented
with a consent form and terms and conditions on the first screen
when they installed the app. We instructed each participant via
a notification to uninstall our app at the end of the experiment.
We also shutdown our server at the end of the experiment to pre-
vent collecting data from participants who may have forgotten to
uninstall the app. To promote security and privacy, we encrypted
the data we collected from users both in transition and in storage.
Our server was located in the UK. We will delete the data upon
publication of the study.
4 RESULTS
In this section, we present the results from examining factors influ-
encing users to use unsecured Wi-Fi.
4.1 Mobile data preservation heuristic
To examine how the constraints of mobile data allowance influenced
the use of unsecured Wi-Fi networks, we investigated whether
*Significant at p < 0.05, n = 71
Figure 2: Changes in the proportions of participants using
unsecuredWi-Fi networks as their data allowance depleted.
more participants would use the networks as their data allowance
depleted.
First, we ran a polynomial regression using a cubic model (equa-
tion 1) to examine the relationship between the usage of unsecured
Wi-Fi and the remaining data allowance. The model enabled us to
determine the optimal point at which participants displayed risk-
taking behavior by using unsecured networks. We chose the cubic
model (equation 1) as it best fitted our dataset, showing a larger
Nagelkerke R2 value8 than the linear and quadratic model.
y = ax3 + bx2 + cx + d (1)
Wherey is the proportion of participants that uses unsecured Wi-Fi
networks; x is the percentage of remaining mobile data allowance
on a 10% interval scale; a, b, and c are the coefficients; and d is the
constant.
The model showed that early in the data plan cycle, an increasing
proportion of participants used unsecured Wi-Fi networks as their
mobile data allowance depleted from 100% to 80% (Figure 2). From
this point onward, a decreasing proportion of participants used
unsecured Wi-Fi. This trend continued until the remaining data
allowance reached around 30%, when a change of direction emerged.
More participants connected to unsecured Wi-Fi from that point
onward and at an accelerated rate — suggesting that 30% is an
optimal point at which participants displayed risk-taking behavior
in order to preserve mobile data allowance.
Our dataset showed that some participants did not connect to
any unsecuredWi-Fi networks during the experiment. This could be
because they were using non-frequently used devices to take part in
our study or they connected to secure Wi-Fi at their workplace and
at home only. Hence, as a conservative approach, we ran another
regression with these participants excluded. Despite the differences
in the coefficients and constant, the model showed a similar trend
(Figure 3). The 30% remaining data allowance was still a tipping
8The R2 determined the percentage of variation in the dependent variables that was
explained by the model.
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*Significant at p < 0.05, n = 45
Figure 3: Changes in the proportions of participants who
used unsecured Wi-Fi networks as their data allowance de-
pleted (excluding participants who did not use these net-
works during the experiment)
out which participants displayed risk-taking behavior and turned
to unsecured Wi-Fi networks.
We also ran a Cochran’s Q Test (equation 2) to analyze whether
the differences in the observed proportions of participant using
unsecured Wi-Fi networks as the mobile data allowance depleted
were statistically significant. We checked that our data met the four
assumptions needed for Cochran’s Q Test9.
T = k (k − 1)
∑k
j=1 (X j − Nk )2∑b
i=1 Xi (k − Xi )
(2)
Where k is the proportion to be observed (i.e. the remaining mobile
data allowance on a scale of 10% interval from 1.0, 0.9 âĂę to 0.0);
b is the number of participants; X j is the column total for the jt h
proportion; Xi is the row total for the it h proportion; and N is the
grand total.
The Cochran’s Q test determined that the differences observed
were statistically significant for both analysis i.e., including and
excluding participants who did not connect to any unsecured Wi-Fi
networks during the experiment (x2 (10) = 32.29, p < 0.001).
We further analyzed whether participants with unequal sized
data plan (i.e., small vs large data plan) would exhibit the same
behavior. We classified participants having at least 3 GB/month and
less than 3 GB/month, respectively, as the Data Rich and the Data
Poor.10 This 3 GB/month cut-off was the median in the data set. We
also considered it large enough for an ordinary user to not be too
worried with preserving mobile data.
We found that the 30% remaining data allowance remained the
optimal point at which both the Data Rich and the Data Poor leaned
91. One dependent variable with two possible dichotomous outcomes (i.e. using unse-
cured Wi-Fi (1) or not using the networks (0)), 2. Three or more categorical related
groups (i.e. remaining data allowance on a 10% interval scale from 100% to 0%), 3. Ran-
domly selected samples, 4. Sufficiently large sample size (n = 71 for total population,
n = 45 excluding participants who did not use any unsecured Wi-Fi networks during
the experiment).
10Participants on a pay-as-you-go plan were classified as Data Poor.
*Significant at p < 0.05, n = 71
Figure 4: Changes in the proportion of the Data Rich and
the Data Poor using unsecuredWi-Fi networks as their data
allowance depleted.
towards using unsecured Wi-Fi networks. More of the Data Rich
than the Data Poor used open unsecured public Wi-Fi networks
(Figure 4). The differences observed among the proportion of par-
ticipants using unsecured networks as the data allowance depleted
were statistically significant among the Data Rich (x2 (10) = 28.41,
p < 0.01) but not among the Data Poor (x2 (10) = 10.97, p > 0.05)
— suggesting that the differences among the latter could be due to
chance. But these results included participants who did not use any
unsecured Wi-Fi during the experiment. Again, considering the
possibility of participants using infrequently used devices in the
study or they only connected to secureWi-Fi at their workplace and
at home, we undertook a conservative approach and ran another
regression — excluding participants that did not use unsecured Wi-
Fi during the experiment. The median of mobile data plan became
4 GB/month; hence, the Data Rich had at least 4 GB/month and the
Data Poor had less.
We observed that the 30% optimal point at which the Data Rich
displayed risk-taking behavior and used unsecured Wi-Fi networks
remained unchanged (Figure 5). However, the optimal point of the
Data Poor now shifted from 30% to 40% — suggesting they were
more sensitive to resource preservation heuristic than the Data
Rich. In addition, more of the Data Poor than the Data Rich used
unsecured Wi-Fi networks after the optimal point. The changes in
the proportion of participants were also statistically significant for
both the Data Rich (x2 (10) = 22.56, p < 0.05) and the Data Poor
(x2 (10) = 18.31, p < 0.05).
4.2 Battery power preservation heuristic
To examine whether the constraints of battery power on the mo-
bile devices influenced the use of unsecured Wi-Fi networks, we
investigated whether more participants would use the networks as
the battery depleted.
We ran a similar polynomial regression using a cubic model
(equation 3) which also best fitted our dataset.
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*Significant at p < 0.05, n = 45
Figure 5: Changes in the proportion of the Data Rich and
the Data Poor using unsecuredWi-Fi networks as their data
allowance depleted (excluding participants that did not use
these networks during the experiment)
y = ax3 + bx2 + cx + d (3)
Where y is the proportion of participants that decides to use un-
secured Wi-Fi networks; x is the percentage of remaining battery
level on a 10% interval scale; a, b, and c are the coefficients; and d
is the constant.
The model produced a bell-shaped curve shown in Figure 6. As
the battery depleted, an increasing proportion of participants con-
nected to unsecured Wi-Fi networks but that trend stopped when
the battery reached approximately 60%. From that point onward,
the curve turned downward; fewer participants used the networks.
Excluding participants who did not connect to any unsecured Wi-
Fi networks during the experiment produced a similar bell-shape
curve (Figure 7). This could possibly be due to participants not
using their devices once their battery level reached a certain level.
Nonetheless, the Cochran’s Q test determined that the differences
in the proportions of participants using unsecured networks as the
battery level depleted were statistically significant for both anal-
ysis (x2 (10) = 56.95, p < 0.001). Therefore, there was sufficient
evidence to reject the hypothesis that as the battery level depleted,
more participants would used unsecured Wi-Fi networks.
4.3 Perceived risks of using unsecured Wi-Fi
networks
We examined whether the participants’ perceived likelihood that
public Wi-Fi can be compromised (on a scale of 0% to 100%, 0%
being least likely and 100% being most likely) affected their usages
of unsecured Wi-Fi. We considered public Wi-Fi a reasonable proxy
of unsecured Wi-Fi networks.
We first analyzed the mean difference in the perceived risks be-
tween participants who did not use any unsecured Wi-Fi and those
that connected at least once during the experiment. We hypothe-
sized that participants that used unsecured Wi-Fi would rate the
*Significant at p < 0.05, n = 71
Figure 6: A cubic model of changes in the proportion of par-
ticipants using unsecured Wi-Fi networks as battery level
depleted
*Significant at p < 0.05, n = 45
Figure 7: A cubic model of changes in the proportion of par-
ticipants using unsecured Wi-Fi networks as battery level
depleted (excluding participants who did not use these net-
works during the experiment)
risk lower. We ran an independent sample T-Test for equal (equa-
tion 4.1) and unequal (equation 4.2) variances to evaluate whether
the observed difference in the mean was statistically significant.
We checked that our data met the assumptions required for the
T-Test11. We also used the Levene’s Test 12 for equality of variances
to determine whether the data sets were subjected to (equation
111. Dependent continuous variables (i.e. the perceived risks on a scale of 0 âĂŞ 100%),
2. Independent variable has two categorical independent groups (i.e. used or did NOT
use unsecured Wi-Fi), 3. Independence of observations, 4. No significant outliers, 5.
Normally distributed independent variables, 6. Homogeneity of variances (tested and
corrected by the Levene’s Test)
12Automatically generated by SPSS in the independence samples T-Test.
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Table 1: Pearson’s correlation between the frequency of us-
ing unsecured Wi-Fi networks and the perceived risks. (In-
cluding/excluding participants that did not connect to any
unsecured Wi-Fi network during the experiment.)
Parameter Including ExcludingData Rich Data Poor Data Rich Data Poor
r -0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.02
n 37 34 17 28
p 0.87 0.65 0.93 0.93
4.1) or (equation 4.2) — a statistically significant result (p > 0.05)
assumed equal variances and would be subjected to (4.1).
t = (µ1 − µ2)/σp
√
1/n1 + 1/n2 (4.1)
t = (µ1 − µ2)/σ
√
σ 21 /n1 + σ
2
2 /n2 (4.2)
Where µ1 is the mean risk of using public Wi-Fi as perceived by
participants that used unsecured Wi-Fi networks at least once dur-
ing the experiment; µ2 is the mean risk as perceived by participants
that did not use unsecured networks during the experiment; n1 is
the number of participants that used unsecured Wi-Fi network at
least once during the experiment; n2 is the number of participants
that did not use unsecured networks during the experiment; σp
is the pooled standard deviation of the total population; σ1 is the
standard deviation of n1; and σ2 is the standard deviation of n2.
We found that participants that used unsecured Wi-Fi networks
at least once during the experiment rated the risk lower than those
who did not (µ1 = 58.33, µ2 = 64.92). However, the difference was
statistically insignificant (t (69) = −0.94, p = 0.35), suggesting it
could be due to chance.
We then analyzed whether the frequency of using unsecured
Wi-Fi could be influenced by the perceived risks of using the net-
works. We examined Pearson’s correlation coefficients (equation
5) between these two variables. We checked that our data sets met
the assumptions13 required for Pearson’s correlation test.
Px,y = cov (x ,y)/σxσy (5)
Where cov is the covariance; σx is the standard deviation of the par-
ticipants’ frequency of using unsecured Wi-Fi networks during the
experiments; and σy is the standard deviation of the participant’s
perceived likelihood that public Wi-Fi can be compromised.
We found a negative correlation between the perceived risks of
using public Wi-Fi and the frequency of using unsecured Wi-Fi net-
works. As the perceived risks increased, the frequency decreased.
However, the correlation was statistically insignificant (r = −0.05,
n = 71, p = 0.67). Excluding participants that did not connect to un-
secured Wi-Fi during the experiment also showed an insignificant
negative correlation (r = −0.02, n = 5, p = 0.91). We found a mix
of negative and positive correlations among the Data Rich and the
Data Poor but none were statistically significant either (Table 1).
131. Two continuous variables (i.e. the perceived risks on a scale of 0 âĂŞ 100% and the
frequency of using unsecured Wi-Fi), 2. Linear relationship between the two variables,
3. No significant outliers, 4. The two variables were normally distributed.
These findings provided sufficient evidence to reject the hypoth-
esis that the perceived risks of unsecured Wi-Fi networks affect the
decision to use these networks. They also supported the findings
of prior work [35], which observed similar behavior among the
Japanese.
4.4 Demographic Factors
We ran binary logistic regressions (equation 6) which predicted
the probability of participants using — or not using — unsecured
Wi-Fi networks based on their demography such as age, gender,
employment status, etc. This type of regression is generally used
to test whether an observation falls into one of two value of a di-
chotomous dependent variable based on the independent variables.
We checked that our data met the four assumptions14 needed for
the regressions and analyzed the Nagelkerke R2 values.
Pr (Yi = 1|Xi = xi ) = exp (β0 + β1xi )/(1 + exp (β0 + β1xi )) (6)
Where Y is a binary response variable, Yi = 1 if a participant
used unsecured Wi-Fi network, Yi = 0 if a participant did not
use the network, X = (X1,X2, ...,Xk ) is the independent variable
(i.e. gender, age group, education, employment status, and income
level).
We found statistically significant correlations between age, edu-
cation, income, and the use of unsecured Wi-Fi networks at various
remaining data allowance and battery intervals. But no consistent
pattern emerged.
4.4.1 Age. When the remaining data allowance was at 40% and
90%, participants aged 26-35 were 0.06 times (β = −2.84,OR = 0.06,
p < 0.05, R2 = 0.30) and 0.05 times (β = −2.98,OR = 0.05, p < 0.05,
R2 = 0.64) less likely to use unsecured Wi-Fi networks compared to
participants aged 18-25 (the reference group). Moreover, at the 50%
battery level, participants aged 26-35 were 0.10 times (β = −2.27,
OR = 0.10, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.29) less likely to use unsecured Wi-
Fi networks than the reference group. At the 80% battery level,
participants aged 36-65 were 236.35 times (β = 5.47, OR = 236.35,
p < 0.05, R2 = 0.46) more likely to do so. When we excluded
participants that did not use any unsecured Wi-Fi networks during
the experiment, participants aged 26-35were 0.003 times (β = −5.99,
OR = 0.003, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.46) less likely to use unsecured Wi-
Fi networks, and participants aged 36-65 became 3,278.36 times
(β = 8.10, OR = 3,278.36, p < 0.01, R2 = 0.67) more likely. This
finding contradicted the survey by Ofcom [28], which reported
that more young (age 18-24) than older people used public Wi-Fi.
Perhaps, the latter group said they had used or thought they would
use less public Wi-Fi than they usually did in real-life.
4.4.2 Education. We did not find significant correlation between
the use of unsecured Wi-Fi and education level at any remaining
mobile data interval. However, compared to participants with a
bachelor’s degree (reference group), participants having postgrad-
uate degree were 0.05 times (β = −3.00, OR = 0.05, p < 0.05,
141. One dependent dichotomous variable (i.e. used or did NOT use unsecured Wi-Fi,
2. At least one independent variable (e.g., gender, education level, etc.), 3. Independent
variable were mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories, 4. A linear relationship be-
tween any continuous independent variable and the logit transformation of dependent
variable (not applicable as our predictors were categorical).
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R2 = 0.46) less likely to use unsecured Wi-Fi networks when the re-
maining battery was 80%. When excluding participants who did not
use any unsecured Wi-Fi networks during the experiment, the odds
reduced to 0.02 times (β = −3.80, OR = 0.02, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.67).
4.4.3 Income. We did not find significant correlation between the
use of unsecured Wi-Fi and income level at any remaining mo-
bile data interval. However, high-income participants were more
likely to use unsecured Wi-Fi networks than basic-income partici-
pants (reference group)15. When the remaining battery was 30%,
40%, and 70%, high-income participants were 15.20 times (β = 2.72,
OR = 15.20, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.34), 13.52 times (β = 2.60,OR = 13.52,
p < 0.05, R2 = 0.36), and 15.99 times (β = 2.77, OR = 15.99,
p < 0.05, R2 = 0.36), respectively, more likely to use unsecured
Wi-Fi networks. When we exclude participants that did not use un-
secured networks during the experiment, high-income participants
were 81.14 times (β = 4.40, OR = 81.14, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.47) and
29.73 times (β = 3.39, OR = 29.73, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.46) more likely
to use the networks when the remaining battery was 40% and 50%,
respectively. The results were counter-intuitive but one possible
explanation is that the level of income is not always a proxy for
mobile data allowance. Some people with lower income may have
larger data plan than some high earners do. For instance, students
frequently using social media and/or constantly on instant messag-
ing are likely to have large mobile data plan, despite having low
income, and use less of public Wi-Fi. Other possible explanations
are micronumerosity or multicollinearity inflating the standard
errors of the parameter estimates and thereby lowering the power
of the hypothesis tests.
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss how we can apply the knowledge from
this study, the limitations of the study, and possible future work.
5.1 Applications
The main findings of our study are that mobile data preservation
heuristic plays a significant role in influencing users to use unse-
cured Wi-Fi networks, and that users are unlikely to stop using
these networks, especially when they are running low on data
allowance. This insight offers several potential benefits.
First, advising users to stop using public Wi-Fi is likely to be
ineffective. Policy makers may consider revising advices such as
"Use mobile data services such as 4G in preference to public Wi-Fi
wherever possible." — Action Fraud UK [1], "The simplest precaution
is not to connect to the Internet using unknown hotspots, and instead
use your mobile 3G or 4G mobile network, which will have built-in
security." — The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) [26], or the
Football Association (FA) asking England players and staff not to
use public or hotel Wi-Fi at the 2018 World Cup in Russia [9]. These
advices would have been long forgotten when the data allowance is
running low. The resource preservation heuristic would take over
and blind users from potential ramifications.
Awareness programme aiming to increase the perceived risks of
using unsecured Wi-Fi networks may not work either. We showed
that the perceived risks of using unsecured Wi-Fi networks did
15Defined by the applicable highest income tax rate. High-income and basic-income
participants were subjected to 40% and 20% tax rate, respectively.
not significantly affect the usage of these networks. Policy makers
may consider placing a greater emphasis on encouraging the use of
virtual private network (VPN). However, this solution has its own
challenge. The adoption rate is relatively low. Norton reported in
2016 that 16% of people in the UK used a VPNwhen using publicWi-
Fi [27] and later in 2017 that 25% of their 5,532 survey participants
from 15 countries did the same [40]. In Australia, the reported rate
in 2016 is even lower; only 10% of public Wi-Fi users said they use
VPN [20].
A more promising solution is shifting the responsibilities from
users to other stakeholders in the ecosystem: application developers,
public Wi-Fi providers, and telecom providers. We should continue
to encourage application developers to encrypt transmitted data.
In light of the new EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
failure to protect personal data of the EU’s citizen could result in
not only damage in reputation but also potential fines of up to 4% of
annual global turnover or e20 Million (whichever is greater) [10]
— sending a strong incentive to organisations to encrypt data. The
tech industry could also help to play a role. Examples of initia-
tives already in place include: Microsoft using various encryption
methods and protocols to protect data across its products such as
Office 365 and Azure [21], Apple encouraging developers to encrypt
data [6], and Google claiming to have designed security controls to
reduce burden on Android developers [14].
For public Wi-Fi providers, there is currently no legal require-
ment in the UK that compels them to encrypt their network data
by default. Businesses want customers to connect to Wi-Fi as eas-
ily as possible; hence, offering open unsecured Wi-Fi networks is
a commercially attractive solution . However, the WPA3, a new
standard of Wi-Fi security, may change the game. It claims to offer
individualized data encryption – an encryption mechanism without
authentication [4]. Policy makers may consider promoting the ben-
efits of WPA3 to encourage public Wi-Fi providers to implement
it.
Government agencies responsible for cyber security could con-
sider working with telecoms regulators to review mobile data pric-
ing and roaming charges. Allowing consumers to afford more data
is similar to the giving a bandwidth gift, a concept introduced by
behavior economists as a way to improve the quality of decision-
making among the poor whose minds were frequently taxed by
financial constraints [23]. Cheaper plans would allow consumers
to rely less on unsecured public Wi-Fi networks. The elimination
of roaming charge among the EU states in 2017 showed that the
share of travellers using mobile data roaming as often as at home
country had doubled in the first summer after the rule came into
effect [11].
5.2 Limitations and possible future work
Our study has inherent limitations. First, we are aware of the possi-
bility that participants may be cautious of using unsecured Wi-Fi
after installing the app and change their habits. However, the three-
month longitudinal study should be long enough to stabilize their
routines. Some participants may not have connected to any un-
secured Wi-Fi during the experiments because they were using
non-regularly used devices to take part in the study or spend most
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of their time at their workplace and at home where there are se-
cure Wi-Fi. There could also be unnoticed bugs that caused failure
in data collection. However, we considered this in our analysis
as we included and excluded these participants which sufficiently
addressed this limitation.
Also, some of the insignificant results from the correlation and
causation analysis such as those reported on the effect of income
and education levelmay reflect influences fromunderlying variables
which future work could explore with a larger sample size to fully
understand the causal factors.
In addition, the behaviour observedmay not be universal. Android-
based users may behave differently from non-Android users. Our
samples were also restricted to UK residents. Mobile users in other
countries, especially where mobile data is expensive or slow, could
have different preferences. Future study may seek to examine non-
Android users and/or those outside the UK to confirm or contrast
our findings.
There may also be other factors influencing the use of unsecured
Wi-Fi networks which were not explored in this study e.g., the avail-
ability or connection speed of mobile data, how much participants
value their data, etc. Future work could consider integrating these
factors in the study and build a predictive model of how the users
make a trade-off to further improve our understanding. Finally,
examining the effect of resource preservation heuristic in a wider
context of cyber security presents a research opportunity.
6 CONCLUSION
We examined factors influencing the use of unsecured Wi-Fi net-
works. The novelty in this study lies in the insight drawn from
revealed preferences i.e., real life user-generated data collected
through My Wi-Fi Choices app. Our findings support the evidence
from previous studies that examined stated preferences and showed
that the constraint of mobile data brings about the resource preser-
vation heuristic and significantly prompt users to use unsecured
Wi-Fi. We also showed that not all types of resources instigates such
behaviour. While the remaining mobile data played a significant
role, the remaining battery power played less of a role. Age, educa-
tion, and income level also influence the decisions to use unsecured
Wi-Fi networks.
Using unsecured network is a worrying notion for policy makers
keen to promote the security and privacy of online transactions.
Since not everyone has unlimited mobile data, asking users to stop
using such networks, especially when their mobile data are running
low, is ineffective. Encouraging users to use a protective tool (e.g.,
VPN) when making sensitive transactions on unsecured Wi-Fi net-
works could also help but the main challenge is convincing users to
use these tools. We argue that a more promising solution is shifting
the responsibilities to mitigate the risks to other stakeholders in
the ecosystem: application developers, public Wi-Fi providers, and
telecom providers.
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A SURVEY QUESTIONS
1. What is your gender?
• Male
• Female
• Prefer not to say






3. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
• Some high school




4. What is your current employment status? Please choose one that
best describes your status.
• Full time students
• In part-time employments
• In full-time employments
• Not working
• Retired
5. What is your income level? Please choose one UK income tax
rate that best describes it.
• Personal allowance (0%): Less than £11,000
• Basic rate (20%): £11,000 to £43,000
• Higher rate (40%): £43,001 to £150,000
6. In the past year, have you or any person close to you ever




7. From your perspective, what is the likelihood that security could
be compromised when using mobile data plan to connect to the
Internet?
8. From your perspective, what is the likelihood that security could
be compromised when using free public Wi-Fi to connect to the
Internet?
B DEMOGRAPHY OF PARTICIPANTS
Table 2: Demography of all participants
Gender n % Income Level (by Income Tax Rate) n %
Female 42 59.15 Personal allowance (0%): Less than £11,000 31 43.66
Male 29 40.85 Basic rate (20%): £11,000 to £43,000 31 43.66
Total 71 100.00 Higher rate (40%): £43,001 to £150,000 9 12.68
Total 71 100.00
Age n % Employment n %
18-25 34 47.89 Full time students 30 42.25
26-35 25 35.21 In full-time employments 28 39.44
36-65 12 16.90 In part-time employments 7 9.86
Total 71 100.00 Not working (but not on retirement) 4 5.63
Retired 2 2.82
Total 71 100.00
Education Level n %
Some high school 3 4.23
High school graduate 9 12.68
Diploma/Vocation training 6 8.45
Bachelor’s degree 29 40.85
Postgraduate’s degree 24 33.80
Total 71 100.00
